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This  paper  presents  evidence  on  the  key  role  of  infrastructure  in  the  Andean 
Community trade patterns. Three distinct but related gravity models of bilateral trade are 
used.  The  first  model  aims  at  identifying  the  importance  of  the  Preferential  Trade 
Agreement and adjacency on intra-regional trade, while also checking the traditional roles 
of economic size and distance. The second and third models also assess the evolution of the 
Trade Agreement and the importance of sharing a common border, but their main goal is to 
analyze the relevance of including infrastructure in the augmented gravity equation, testing 
the theoretical assumption that infrastructure endowments, by reducing trade and transport 
costs, reduce “distance” between bilateral partners. Indeed, if one accepts distance as a 
proxy  for  transportation  costs,  infrastructure  development  and  improvement  drastically 
modify it. Trade liberalization eliminates most of the distortions that a protectionist tariff 
system imposes on international business; hence transportation costs represent nowadays a 
considerably larger barrier to trade than in past decades. As new trade pacts are being 
negotiated in the Americas, borders and old agreements will lose significance; trade among 
countries will be nearly without restrictions, and bilateral flows will be defined in terms of 
costs  and  competitiveness.  Competitiveness,  however,  will  only  be  achieved  by  an 
improvement in infrastructure services at all points in the production-distribution chain. 
 
   3
1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper adds further evidence to the argument that infrastructure development is 
a  source  of  integration  and  competitiveness.  It  shows  the  dynamic  role  played  by 
infrastructure in explaining as well as determining the trade flows within and outside the 
Andean Community. 
  The work is organized as follows. The next two sections set the for our analysis. 
Section 2 briefly reviews the evolution of the Andean Community since its formation in 
1969,  focusing  on  the  consolidation  of  the  internal  market  and  its  trade  pattern.  An 
augmented gravity model of bilateral trade flows, with cross section data for the period 
1993 to 1999, is applied yearly to determine whether the Andean Pact did in fact increase 
trade within the region, and to capture the effect of adjacency on trade among its members. 
Section 3 discusses the role of infrastructure in trade, showing theoretical and statistical 
evidences  that  location  and  endowments  play  a  decisive  role  in  determining  whether 
countries will decide to enhance their trading opportunities by developing (transport-cost 
reducing) infrastructure. It then provides a  glimpse on the transport modes used in the 
Andean Community trade. 
Section 4, where the effect of infrastructure is fully assessed, is the core of the 
paper. Going beyond a traditional gravity model, we consider that transportation costs are 
not only a function of distance but also of the availability of infrastructure, such as roads, 
energy  and  telecommunications  networks.  These  variables  are  summarized  in  an  index 
measuring the level of infrastructure in the countries concerned, modifying the distance 
variable. The analysis sheds light on the role played by infrastructure and its impact on the 
relevance of other explanatory variables. We then link the results to the new concept of 
infrastructure development in the region, where its interaction with geographical space is 
regarded as a key integration and competitiveness tool. The final section concludes.   
 
2.  THE ANDEAN COMMUNITY: TRADE FLOWS AND REGIONAL 
INTEGRATION 
2.1 Evolution of the Andean Community Pact. 
   4
The beginnings of the Andean Community date back to 1969, when a group of 
countries signed the Cartagena Agreement, also known as the Andean Pact, for establishing 
a customs union within a period of ten years. Since then, Andean integration has lived 
through a series of different stages where an initial inward-looking project, based on the 
import substitution model, gradually gave way to a more open-regionalism initiative. In 
June  1997,  the  group  became  the  Andean  Community,  with  the  Cartagena  Agreement 
being modified by the Trujillo Protocol. The Protocol created a Presidential Council and a 
Council of Foreign Ministers, giving to both a critical role in the decision making process. 
It  also  strengthened  the  internal  cohesion  of  the  integration  process,  by  placing  all  its 
institutions and mechanisms under a new umbrella, the Andean Integration System. The 
Andean Community is, nowadays, a regional organization endowed with international legal 
status and five members: Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia. 
Since  1987,  members  began  to  design  a  new  strategy  to  keep  up  with  the 
liberalization process that was taking place in Latin America. The formation of a  Free 
Trade  Area  (FTA)  in  1992  evolved  into  an  imperfect  Customs  Union.  Colombia  and 
Venezuela,  already  in  February  1992,  eliminated  tariffs  and  other  restrictions  to  their 
reciprocal trade. Bolivia joined them in September 1992 and Ecuador in January 1993, 
when the FTA entered into full operation among these four countries. Peru temporarily 
suspended its obligations under the liberalization program; instead, from 1992, it negotiated 
bilateral trade agreements with each of its Andean partners and, in some cases, partially 
liberalized the reciprocal trade flows. These bilateral agreements were effective until 1997, 
when a compromise was reached for Peru’s gradual incorporation into the Andean FTA 
(Decision 414).  Most products were liberalized until 2000 and the remaining sensitive 
products, including agricultural goods, will be totally liberalized by 2005. 
In  1994,  the  Common  External  Tariff  (CET)  was  approved  by  Decision  370. 
Implementing the CET, as usual, proved difficult. At the time Decision 370 was made, 
Bolivia was exempt from it and Peru, as mentioned, did not play a part in the process. It 
was again Colombia and Venezuela the two to firstly adopt the CET, in 1994, joined by 
Ecuador in 1995. The Andean CET is determined by the level of processing, with a 5% rate 
applied  to  raw  materials  and  industrial  inputs;  10  and  15%  to  intermediate  inputs  and 
capital goods, respectively, and 20% to final goods. The CET average is 13.6%, and it has a   5
20%  ceiling.  The  customs  union,  effective  for  Venezuela,  Colombia  and  Ecuador,  is 
gradually encompassing Bolivia and Peru. Full adoption is expected also in 2005.  
  The Andean Community  has  addressed  most of the newer trade issues, such as 
investment,  competition  policy,  services  and  intellectual  property  rights  and  adopted 
common policies in most of these areas
1. The development of a common foreign policy is 
also a main objective, and involves the joint participation of all members in the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) as well as in the negotiations concerning regional agreements. 
The Andean countries form a market with over 115 million people living in an area 
of 4,700,000 square kilometers. Their joint GDP in 2001 reached US$ 283 billion.  The 
most important markets for their exports, as shown in Table 1, are the United States, the 
European Union (EU) and the Community itself.  
Liberalization of the internal market has had an important effect on trade among its 
member  countries.  Trade  flows  have  reached  unprecedented  levels,  with  intra-regional 
trade growing faster than trade with the rest of the world, as Table 1 shows.  After a decade 
of flat or declining growth in the ‘80s, intra-Andean trade picked up in 1989 and grew 
steadily after 1990.  At the end of 2001, intra-Andean exports amounted to US$ 5.6 billion, 
more than double the 1992 level.  Equally important, Andean trade with the rest of the 
world has also risen; imports and exports from and to countries outside the Community 
have consistently increased since the agreement was reactivated in the early ‘90s (Table 1). 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 by here 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Though there is a commitment to establish a Common Market by 2005, at the latest, 
nowadays, as mentioned above, the Community is an incomplete customs union, as both 
the CET and the FTA are still subject to a number of exceptions. 
2.2.  A first gravity model specification. 
 
                                                 
1 As a few examples, Decision 291 replaced Decision 24, which restricted foreign direct investment activities, 
granting  national  treatment  to  foreign  investors  and  eliminating  all  restrictions  on  capital  and  profit 
remittances, Decision 344 granted patent rights to pharmaceutical products, and Decision 351 dealt with 
copyrights.   6
In order to create a background against which to analyze the growth of trade among 
Andean countries, we first estimated the following gravity equation: 
 
0 1 2 3 4 ln ln ij i j ij ij M YY D ACP Border e b b b b b = + + + + +                                             (1) 
 
where: Mij =value of country i imports from country j ; YiYj = the multiplied GDP from both 
countries as a proxy for size ; Dij = distance between country i and country j to capture 
trade costs ; ACP = dummy to measure the impact of integration on the trade of member 
countries -  it  takes  the  value of  one  when  both  countries  are  members  of  the  Andean 
Community and zero otherwise ; Border = dummy to measure the impact of adjacency - it 
assumes the value of one when the countries have a common border
2.   
The  period  analyzed  was  1993-1999,  as  integration  gained  momentum  after 
signature of the FTA, in 1992, and our aim is to test the significance and value of its impact 
over intra-regional trade. The countries in the left hand side of (1) are the five Andean 
members, and those at the right, the partners, i.e. their suppliers or exporters. Partners were 
selected based on the existence of bilateral trade with the members. 
Trade flows, in millions of current US dollars, were obtained from IMF (2001), 
GDP data, in current US dollars, are from the World Bank Global Development Network 
Database
3  and  the  distance  between  capital  cities,  in  kilometers,  was  obtained  from 
Haveman’s web page.
4 
Individual regressions were run for each year based on equation (1). Before running 
the regressions, a descriptive analysis of the data was performed.  This led to transform 
imports and GDP by natural logarithm and distance by taking its square root. Ordinary 
Least  Squares  (OLS)  were  used,  with  the  transformed  data  on  imports  as  dependent 
variable. A number of countries in Asia and Africa that did not trade with the Andean 
Community were removed in each year. 
                                                 
2  Frankel  (1997)  used  gravity  models  to  show  that  regionalization  could  be  explained  by  geographical 
proximity and preferential trade agreements; Krugman (1991) formalized the role played by geographical 
proximity in the regionalization process, dummy variables being since then used to simulate and analyze 
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The results, in standardized coefficients, together with the R
2 for each regression 
and the significance of the coefficients, can be found in Table 2. The gravity equation 
performs  well  in  explaining  bilateral  trade  between  the  Andean  countries  and  their 
respective  partners.    The  global  adjustment  of  the  regression  is  satisfactory,  as  the  R
2 
coefficients present values that are superior to 0.70. The independent variables had, in all 
cases, the expected sign and were statistically significant according to the F and t-tests. 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 by here 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
The  effect  of  the  product  of  the  countries’  GDP  is  positive  and  statistically 
significant, ranging between 0.862 and 0.901. These values are consistent with those found 
by  Frankel  (1997)  and  Echavarria  (1998),  for  the  periods  1965-1980  and  1986-1995, 
respectively, though slightly higher due to the fact that size is playing a more important 
role  on  trade  nowadays  and,  of  course,  that  the  partners  chosen  for  each  analysis  are 
different. The coefficients comply with the  model assumption that trade increases with 
economic size, and, in the case of the Andean countries, this has a strong effect over their 
trade.   
The  distance  coefficients  have  a  negative  sign,  are  statistically  significant  and 
present values between -0.443 and -0.345. Distance, however, has less impact than GDP. 
The value and sign of the distance coefficients are also similar to those found by Frankel 
(1997) and Echavarria (1998). These authors worked with a period before transportation 
services were liberalized and transportation costs reduced; therefore their coefficients are, 
in most cases, higher than the ones found here, when the effect of distance was already 
reduced.    
The coefficients for the Preferential Agreement dummy fluctuate between 0.101 
and 0.160. Their statistical significance (p-values) improves from 1995 onwards, and they 
have a positive evolution but low levels (Figure 1). It is important to remind that the FTA 
became effective only in 1993 and that Peru was out of the Pact until 1997; additionally, a 
high  degree  of  exceptions  applying  different  regulations  diminish  the  influence  of  the 
Agreement.  Stronger  effects  from  the  Pact  may  be  expected  in  the  coming  years,  as   8
regulations are uniformly applied by all partners. The positive evolution of the coefficients 
and their improvement in significance reflect that member countries are trading more and 
more among themselves, with the exception of 1999. This year was plagued with economic 
and political crises  in  some  members,  like  the  macroeconomic and banking  crashes in 
Ecuador, the political problems in Peru that led to the flee of President Fujimori, and the 
floods in Venezuela. Overall, both our empirical results as well as the trade data show that 
the Agreement and the FTA had a positive impact on trade among member countries.  
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 by here 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
The dummy for adjacency tries to capture whether common frontiers, that enable 
border trade, do in fact increase trade flows. The coefficients for this dummy are positive 
and statistically significant, though low and presenting a rather negative evolution.  The 
positive values do confirm that countries having a common border will trade more, but the 
low values and the lack of a positive trend - rather a declining one - suggest that these 
economies are relatively small and may trade more with bigger, despite geographically 
apart, economies. It is important to mention that sometimes countries do not engage in 
more border trade due to inappropriate transportation infrastructure and harsh geographical 
conditions, as in the Andes mountain range, which may considerably increase cost. 
 
3.  ANDEAN COMMUNITY: TRADE AND INFRASTRUCTURE 
3.1 Trade, infrastructure and regional integration. 
 
Since Krugman reminded, in 1991, that geography matters when trade is concerned, 
several authors, as Hummels (1998), tried to determine the effect of distance and the role of 
infrastructure  in  a  bilateral  trade  model.  Empirical  works,  as  Porojan  (2000),  used 
investment data as a proxy for infrastructure. Nevertheless, the use of investment data to 
estimate  infrastructure  capital  may  present  problems,  as  Summers  and  Heston  (1991)   9
argued. The effectiveness of the same investment flow may vary, in different countries, due 
to differences in public sector efficiency and in the prices of infrastructure capital.  
Bougheas,  Demetriades  and  Morgenroth  (1999)  tried  to  examine  the  role  of 
infrastructure in a bilateral trade model and also on transport cost. Their findings predict 
that, for a pair of countries for which investment in infrastructure is optimal, a positive 
relationship between the level of infrastructure and the volume of trade takes place. As a 
consequence,  variations  in  transport  costs  across  countries  may  be  able  to  account  for 
differences in their ability to compete in international markets.  Furthermore, differences in 
the volume and quality of infrastructure may be responsible for the differences in transport 
costs, which in turn may account for differences in competitiveness. As a result, reducing 
the  cost  and  improving  the  quality  of  transport  systems  improves  international  market 
access and therefore prompts an increase in trade. 
There is substantial evidence linking improvements in transportation services and 
infrastructure  in  general  to  improvements  in  export  performance.  Hummels  (1999) 
estimates that exporters with 1% lower shipping costs will enjoy a 5-8% higher market 
share.  Limão and Venables (2001) estimated that the elasticity of trade flows with respect 
to the trade cost factor is approximately –3, and investigated the dependence of transport 
costs  on  geography  and  infrastructure.  Limão  and  Venables  (2001)  estimated  that 
differences in infrastructure account for 40% of the variation in transport costs for coastal 
countries and up to 60% for landlocked countries. Additionally, Wilson (2003) shows that 
the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation countries differ substantially in the quality of their 
transport infrastructure and level of logistics and trade services and that these differences 
mark the gap of trade performance among them. The study concludes that upgrading the 
transport  and  service  infrastructure  of  the  lagging  countries  will  substantially  increase 
trade. 
Martinez-Zarzoso and Nowak-Lehman (2002) examined the role of economic and 
geographical distance for some sectoral exports of Mercosur to the EU. Their findings 
reveal that geographical distance, defined as the physical distance in kilometers between 
capitals modified by an infrastructure index, affects trade negatively. Goods have to be 
transported across countries and transport is not cost free. Transport costs increase with 
distance but may be reduced by a better infrastructure.   10
The real costs of trade, including transportation and the costs of doing business 
internationally, are important determinants of a country’s ability to participate in the world 
economy. As Limão and Venables (2001) pointed out, remoteness and poor transport and 
communications  infrastructure  isolate  countries  and  limit  their  participation  in  the 
international  production  chains.  Improving  the  channels  that  facilitate  the  exchange  of 
goods, services and people is a basic element to any strategy for increasing a region’s 
international competitiveness.  
In terms of regional integration, as stated in IDB (2000), geographical interaction 
creates flows that do not necessarily circulate freely, but that do so through infrastructure 
networks.  Infrastructure  networks  provide  the  physical  support  through  which  flows 
circulate, but to ensure their successful influence in integration and development, a legal 
and  institutional  framework  together  with  efficient  infrastructure-related  services 
operations are needed.  
3.2 Infrastructure integration initiatives in the Andean Community. 
 
Infrastructure development in the Andean Community was, for a long period, not 
only limited by the challenges presented by the natural physical barriers of the Andean 
range but also by economic policies that focused on domestic markets, underestimating the 
benefits  of  trade  and  foreign  investment.  Moreover,  public  deficits,  macroeconomic 
instability, restrictions to foreign capital and historical patterns of trade constrained public 
and private investment in infrastructure. 
Nowadays, infrastructure development is regarded as a source of competitiveness 
and no longer necessarily or exclusively involves the state in its direct provisioning. The 
priority is to update the road system to maintain and increase intra-community trade and at 
the same time interlink the region with the rest of South America. Regional integration 
flows  in  the  Community  are  rarely  channeled  through  specific  routes,  but  rather  use 
networks  that  are  shared  with  domestic  and  global  traffic.  In  many  cases,  services  of 
different  geographical  scope  share  segments  of  the  same  network;  many  infrastructure 
problems  which  constrain  regional  integration  also  hinder  domestic  development  and 
international trade. They include a lack of capacity of existing corridors, poor state of roads 
that communicate with major and secondary markets, delays at border crossing and lack of 
multimodal connections. However, foremost since recently was the lack of financial and   11
political commitment, in member countries, to projects that view infrastructure networks as 
a source of sustainable trade and economic development, and as part of measures that could 
contribute to the flows of goods and services among them. 
 Members are beginning to adopt common provisions on several fronts to facilitate 
and deregulate transportation services, electricity supply and telecommunications, in order 
to  foster  their  intra-regional  trade  and  physical  integration
5.  Specific  provisions  for  all 
modes of transportation, including multimodal transport, were established to determine the 
principles and criteria needed to provide services efficiently
6.  
3.3 Andean Community trade by transportation mode. 
 
The pattern of trade within the Andean Community is determined not only by the 
size of their economies and those of their partners but also by the transportation costs 
incurred when trading. To determine the variables that affect transport costs when members 
perform intra-community trade it is important to analyze the modes of transportation used. 
Table 3 displays trade information by mode of transportation within the Andean 
Community.  Between 1997 and 1999, intra-community exports were mostly delivered by 
road; actually, nearly 49% of the value traded. Maritime transportation occupied second 
place with around 38% of the total value traded, and air transportation was positioned in 
third place with approximately 8% of the total. 
  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 by here 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
In 1997, road transportation was the main delivery method for Bolivia, Colombia, 
Ecuador  and  Venezuela.  In  1998,  Ecuador  increased  the  participation  of  maritime 
transportation and Venezuela did the same in 1999. Venezuelan exports, between 1997 and 
                                                 
5 www.comunidadandina.org/servicios/trans.htm. 
6 In the area of land transportation, for instance, Decisions 398 (passengers) and 399 (goods) determine the 
contractual terms and responsibilities of both carrier and user; international transportation by road is regulated 
by Decision 467; Resolution 300 regulates Decision 399 and determines the accepted forms to be used by 
country authorities and carriers. Similar important measures were taken for ocean transportation, with the 
purpose to harmonize policies and make companies more competitive, and in the area of air transport. 
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1999, were delivered to the other Andean members by road 48% of the time and by sea in 
39%; its imports from the Andean partners were transported to the country 62% of the time 
by  road  and  29%  by  sea.  Likewise,  Colombian  exports,  within  the  same  period,  were 
delivered by road 55% of the time and by sea  in 35%, while imports,  60% and 33%, 
respectively.  
Maritime transportation is used mainly by Peru, in all its deliveries, and by other 
members when trade takes place with partners that do not share a common border, making 
inland  transportation  expensive  and  slow.  It  is  the  traditional  method  of  delivery  for 
Andean countries, when trade is carried out with distant partners as the United States and 
the EU. This makes it the second most important mode of delivery to and from the Andean 
region. Nevertheless, it is important to consider that when goods are carried by sea, in most 
cases,  an  additional  inland stretch  is  needed,  either by  road  or  rail,  both  at  origin  and 
destination. Bolivia, due to its landlocked location, is the main case. It normally combines 
shipment to a Chilean port with inland road transportation, for both its exports and imports 
to countries with which it does not share a common border
7. 
Inland waterway transportation among members is not normally carried out due to 
the fact that there are not well developed corridors in the areas where it may be feasible. 
Moreover,  the  business  clusters  in  each  country  are  often  where  only  road  and  sea 
transportation is possible. 
Cargo by air is relatively limited: shipping merchandise by road takes a shorter 
time,  especially  if  carried  out  between  members  with  a  common  border.  Also,  road 
transportation is the mode of delivery that presents the shortest delays at border crossing
8
. 
Air transportation with partners outside the Andean region is limited and reduced to highly 
perishable goods. 
Border trade within the Andean members between 1997 and 1999 represented 98% 
of the intra-community trade by road and 49% of the total intra-community trade. Thus, 
trade by road between members that do not share a common border was limited. As can be 
seen in Table 4, border trade by road is very significant between Colombia and Venezuela, 
accounting for around 66% of the total border trade in the region by road. Trade between 
Colombia and Ecuador come in second position, with a little more than 23%, and that 
                                                 
7www.comunidadandina.org: Flujos Comerciales Intracomunitarios por Modos de Transporte 1997-1999.   13
between Bolivia and Peru in third place (8%). The lowest level happens between Ecuador 
and Peru, with only 2% of the total value carried. 
In the late ‘80s, the lack of infrastructure and the limited relevance of the Andean 
Agreement made sharing a common border extremely important in terms of trade, for all 
members of the Andean Pact. Trade was performed at borders and there was less interest in 
distant partners, as logistics and transportation services were limited and expensive. By all 
means, distance in those times played a major role and borders marked the natural trade 
partners.  During  the  ‘90s,  the  importance  of  border  trade  diminished  considerably,  the 
coefficients for the dummy in model (1) showing this.  
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 by here 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
4.  EVALUATING THE INFRASTRUCTURE EFFECT 
 
4.1.  Model specification and data. 
 
Model (1) results stressed that economic size (GDP) is probably the most important 
variable when a trade partner is chosen, and established that distance plays a decisive role 
in  terms  of  cost.  Nevertheless,  the  absolute  value  of  the  distance  coefficients  declined 
throughout the period, suggesting that other factors, apart from physical distance itself, may 
be affecting transportation cost (and therefore trade) in the Andean Region. Indeed, as the 
economic size of bilateral partners did not change dramatically within the period analyzed, 
borders were not altered and the basic structure of the Pact was not modified, the variable 
that should be further analyzed is transportation cost and all its associated factors.  
Following the literature described in section 3.1, we specified an augmented gravity 
model where physical distance is modified by an infrastructure index, i.e. a geographical 
distance focusing on the interaction of geography and infrastructure, to determine the effect 
of infrastructure on trade. Transportation costs become not only a function of distance but 
also  of  the  availability  of  public  infrastructure,  such  as  roads,  railroads,  energy  and 
                                                                                                                                                    
8 Personal communication with  the firm ‘ZaiMella del Ecuador S.A’,  active in export-import activities in 
most of the countries members of the Andean  Community.    14
telecommunication networks. These public infrastructure dimensions are summarized in an 
index  that  measures  the  infrastructure  level  of  the  countries,  modifying  the  distance 
variable. 
Re-writing equation (1), bilateral trade is then modeled as: 
 
0 1 2 3 4 ln ln ij i j ij ij M YY GeoD ACP Border e b b b b b = + + + + +                                             (2) 
 
where Mij , YiYj  , ACP and Border are as in (1), while GeoDij is the distance between 
country i and country j modified by the infrastructure index. 
The  analysis  uses  a  cross  section  for  the  period
9  1985-1995.  The  countries 
employed  as  reporters  are  again  the  five  Andean  Community  members;  partners  were 
selected according to their levels of trade with the Andean countries and the availability of 
information on their infrastructure stock. By keeping the dummies for the Andean Pact and 
border effects, the analysis continues to capture the importance of the preferential trade 
agreement and the significance of sharing a border, when infrastructure enters the model. 
Bilateral  trade  flows  and  GDP  came  from  the  same  sources  as  before.  The 
Geographical Distance variable is similar to the one used by Martinez-Zarzoso and Nowak-
Lehmann (2002) and Limão and Venables (2001). It is defined by the physical distance 
between capitals of trading partners (obtained as before) divided by the sum of the two 
countries’  infrastructure  indexes.  The  index was  based  on  five  variables:  kilometers  of 
roads, of paved roads and of railroads, telephone main lines and kilowatts of electricity 
generating capacity, and is explained in the Annex.  
Annual data on physical infrastructure stocks for the reporter and partner countries, 
for  the  period  1985-1995,  were  from  David  Canning’s  1998  Database  of  World 
Infrastructure  Stocks
10.  Data  reported  by  Canning  are  of  two  types:  raw  data  with  a 
minimum  of  manipulation  and  basically  as  they  appear  in  the  original  sources,  and 
processed data, for which some kind of interpolation is carried out (assuming exponential 
growth over the intervening period, for instance). Processed data were used to calculate the 
index,  as  recommended  by  the  author  for  empirical  work,  due  to  their  inter-temporal 
consistency.  Population  data  and  country  area  to  normalize  infrastructure  stock  were 
                                                 
9 The different time span, relative to model (1), was conditioned by the availability of infrastructure data.   
10 www.worldbank.org/html/dec/Publications/Workpapers/WPS1900series/wps1929.   15
obtained from the World Bank Global Development Network Database and the Country 
Watch web page, respectively
11.  
4.2 Empirical results. 
 
Separate OLS regressions were run for each year, for model (2), with the natural log 
of members imports as dependent variable. Again, a number of Asian and African countries 
that did not engage in bilateral trade with the Andean Community were removed from the 
sample. 
The results obtained (in standardized coefficients) for each regression are in Table 
5.  The  R
2  values  range  from  0.653  to  0.735,  for  the  period  between  1985  and  1991; 
between 1992 and 1995, they are in all cases above 0.712. Hence, the gravity equation 
performs well in explaining the bilateral trade of the five Andean Community members, 
especially  in  the  second  part  of  the  period,  reflecting  the  increased  application  and 
importance of the Preferential Trade Agreement. 
Once again, economic size is the most important variable. This not only confirms 
the  findings  in  section  2  but  complies  with  those  found  in  most  empirical  works. 
Nevertheless, it is important to point out that economic size (the multiplied GDP of each 
pair of countries) has a somewhat lower effect when infrastructure is considered in the 
equation. Despite the fact that the purchasing capacity of the partner is the first requirement 
to carry out trade, the lower effect of GDP identified in this second model confirms that the 
infrastructure stocks of both a member and its partner reduce distance between them. In 
fact, they reduce transport costs and therefore reduce the prices of the goods traded, making 
them more accessible and shortening the economic distance between markets. During the 
whole  period  analyzed,  the  value  of  the  GDP  coefficients  are  statistically  significant, 
positive and do not vary significantly from one year to another. They range between 0.718 
and 0.791, similar to those found by Echavarria (1998)  and Frankel (1997) in previous 
empirical work on the Andean Community, though again higher. 
The Andean Pact dummy was not significant before 1990. Until the ‘90s, import 
substitution policies and inward looking regionalism marked the existence of an agreement 
full of exceptions and without operational functions, as members did not fully comply with 
its  requirements:  all  presented  high  tariff  levels  and  multiple  non-tariff  measures.  The 
                                                 
11 www.worldbank.org/research/growth/GDNdata.html ; www.countrywatch.com.   16
results for the Pact dummy confirm that the Preferential Trade Agreement did not influence 
trade among members before market-oriented reforms set the groundwork for boosting the 
integration efforts. Unfortunately, in 1992, despite the launching of the FTA, the Peruvian 
crisis led Venezuela to freeze diplomatic relations with Peru. As a result, Peru temporarily 
suspended its obligations under the liberalization program in the same year. These events 
left the Community without the much needed political support and brought down trade 
among  members  as  confirmed  by  the  drop  in  the  dummy  coefficient,  though  still 
significant.  The  values  since  then  evidence  a  positive  trend,  indicating  the  sustained 
enforcement of the Agreement.  
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 by here 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
These new values for the Pact dummy are also higher than those obtained when 
infrastructure endowments were not considered in the model
12. Inclusion of infrastructure 
endowments did not only modify distance but also strengthened the role of the Preferential 
Trade Agreement. The combination of the appropriate infrastructure and the continuous 
reinforcement of regional integration on different fronts will certainly continue to influence 
intra-community trade in a positive way. 
The border dummy did not only present statistically significant results throughout 
the period but also gained more importance in determining trade. All coefficients were 
above 0.260, being about twice as high as those encountered in model (1). The increased 
importance of border in the Andean Community trade complies with the already mentioned 
fact that nearly 50% of the trade within the region is performed by road and 98% of it is at 
frontiers. However, one of the most important features in the results for this variable is its 
decreasing trend.  Until 1992, the coefficients present higher values, indicating that sharing 
a  common  border  was  far  more  important  than  having  a  trade  agreement.  Although 
existing,  the  agreements  were  not  fully  enforced.  These  higher  values  also  reflect  two 
                                                 
12 Throughout this and the next subsection, when assertions on the relative sizes of the same coefficients in 
different regressions (either in different models, for the same year, or the same model, in different years) are 
made, the appropriate tests of significance were performed. In order not to encumber the text, we avoided 
showing their results; they are however available from the authors.   17
additional issues: the poorer infrastructure and the higher cost resulting from delivering the 
merchandises by other means than road transport. From 1992 onwards, when the FTA was 
becoming operational and transportation costs by sea decreased to affordable numbers in 
terms of transit and frequencies, the importance of sharing a common border was reduced, 
and reached levels closer to the coefficients for geographical distance and the Pact dummy. 
Geographical  Distance  had  statistically  significant,  negative  coefficients, 
confirming that transportation costs, even as represented in the model, reduce trade. The 
results also support the theoretical framework in section 3.1: infrastructure endowments 
reduce bilateral distances. The geographical distance coefficients are roughly half those 
obtained when transportation costs were proxied by physical distance only
13. From 1990 
onwards, they show a positive trend. This evolution is the opposite of the one encountered 
when  only  physical  distance  was  used,  and  tells  that  “distance”  -  as  competition  for 
transportation services increased and new and better ways of shipping goods were used - 
became more flexible, reductions in it having a greater impact on trade. Therefore, a key 
issue in increasing trade flows lies in the development of infrastructure and the capability 
of countries to mobilize efficient delivery services, reducing the prices of goods traded.    
4.3 Further results: importance of partners and reporters infrastructure. 
To analyze the separate role of the infrastructure of both reporters and partners, a 
third gravity model was estimated, under the same theoretical framework. The additional 
feature of the new model was the consideration of two geographical distance variables 
instead of one: the Geographical Distance of the reporter (the five Andean members) and 
that of its partner. 
  The results obtained are in Table 6. The coefficients for economic size and the ACP 
and border dummies present more or less the same evolution, exactly the same sign and 
approximately the same level. Economic size continues to have a positive effect on trade. 
In the same line, the dummy for common border presents important and significant values 
until 1992, before the Preferential Agreement really gained significance. 
  Table 6 shows that, until 1992, the infrastructure of the reporters, i.e. the members 
of the Andean Community, had a higher negative effect on trade than the infrastructure of 
the  bilateral  partner.  This  clearly  points  out  that,  the  lack  of  infrastructure  and  the   18
corresponding gap, compared to other countries in the region in the late ‘80s and early ‘90s, 
negatively  affected  the  trade  opportunities  of  the  Andean  members.  As  in  many  other 
countries in Latin America, their infrastructure deteriorated significantly during the ‘80s 
and early ‘90s, when the region lost considerable ground relative to the industrial countries 
and faster growing emerging economies (Calderon and Servén (2003)). The coefficients 
show that the lack of infrastructure of the reporters reduced the possibilities of trade to a 
higher degree than the level of their partner. In 1989 and 1990, the negative effect of the 
infrastructure of the reporter was approximately two and a half times that of the partner.   
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 6 by here 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
When  infrastructure  started  to  gain  relevance  within  government  targets, 
transportation costs decreased and more and farther destinations could be reached at similar 
prices; the importance of the partner’s infrastructure increased while that of the reporter 
lost influence. The results evidence that the major efforts made by the Andean countries to 
increase the extent of private participation in infrastructure development proved successful. 
Moreover,  the  absolute  value  of  the  distance  elasticity  increases  from  1990.  Progress 
indeed  has  been  made  in  reducing  public  sector  funding  shortfalls  and  improving 
productivity in infrastructure operation, Estache, Wodon and Foster (2002), making, again, 
distance  more  flexible.  In  1995,  the  infrastructure  of  both  countries  becomes  equally 
relevant in cost reduction and efficiency determination. 
4.4. Regional infrastructure perspectives for the Andean Community. 
 
Infrastructure should be considered not only as a key tool for integration but as a 
link  to  sustainable  development.  This  section  briefly  connects  this  new  view  of 
infrastructure  to  the  state  of  the  art  in  the  Andean  region.  By  addressing  the  actual 
characteristics of the existing corridors, and outlining those that reveal the highest potential 
for development, we try to link our findings to reality. 
                                                                                                                                                    
13 The reader should bear in mind that the square root of distance was used in model (1), though this does not 
invalidate the comments in this paragraph.   19
Growing intra-regional trade in the Andean Community, ascertained in the previous 
sections, was followed by market concentration. The pair with the highest share of intra-
regional trade is Venezuela and Colombia and, in second place, Colombia and Ecuador.
  Trade  flows  in  South  America  are  dominated  by  a  few  major  corridors  and 
associated hubs of activity, IDB (2000), but out of the six top hubs only one is located in 
the Andean Community. The bigger flows are not in the Community, but rather in the 
Southern Cone, with Brazil, Chile and, until 2001, Argentina occupying the main positions 
(Table 7). Nevertheless, the Colombia-Venezuela hub, linking Bogotá to Caracas, carries 
more than 3 million tons of cargo annually and is second only to the Argentina-Brazil one. 
Half of  this  cargo  is  moved by  truck  and  half  by  river  and sea  transportation;  all  this 
amounted to 2,577.8 million dollars in 1998. There is also an electricity transmission line 
with 380 MW of capacity. The Ecuador-Colombia flow is the ninth in the ranking, with 
856.5  million  dollars  in  1998.  These  intra-regional  exchanges  are  being  progressively 
upgraded. By 2002, around 50% of the goods traded were high value-added products, and 
among the remaining 50% low value-added products, petroleum stands out. 
   
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 7 by here 
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The  conceptual  issues,  frameworks  and  provisions  for  regional  infrastructure 
development  being  put  into  practice  in  the  Andean  Community  have  been  previously 
mentioned. Nevertheless, the Community, searching for a strategic and common vision for 
development,  not  only  within  the  Andean  region  but  also  within  the  whole  of  South 
America,  joined  the  Integration  of  Regional  Infrastructure  in  South  America  (IIRSA) 
initiative.   
IIRSA is a political and strategic regional vision based on the development of a hub 
encompassing the twelve South American countries. It represents a new planning approach, 
coordinating national sectoral policies as well as implementing projects consistent with the 
regional  partners’  policies.  Therefore,  the  analysis  of  potential  corridors  should  be 
performed  considering  those  in  which  the  Andean  members  participate  as  part  of  the   20
Andean  Agreement  and  also  those  with  the  rest  of  their  existing  and  potential  trading 
partners in South America. 
Exchange hubs, which channel the strongest flows, are complemented by others 
with  smaller  volumes  but  significant  growth  potential.  These  corridors  with  somewhat 
lower volumes are exactly those where additional investment may have the highest returns, 
by reducing bottlenecks and expanding capacity. Approaching regionalism via a framework 
of hubs and corridors contributes to identify potential flows that could be promoted by 
additional integration in different areas, exploiting complementarities between economies 
and developing plans to tie other regions into the existing network. This new view aims at 
transforming trade hubs into integration and development hubs, in which infrastructure is 
not  isolated  but  forms  part  of  a  set  of  activities,  linking  –  through  different  kinds  of 
integration  -  physical  investment  with  social  dimensions  of  development.  Our  results 
strongly confirm the relevance of these points and add further motivation to pursue such 
initiatives.  
The operation of new FTAs in the region, like the Mercosur-Andean Community 
one, may change the trading map of South America. The evidences provided in this paper 
warn that the development of the corresponding hubs and corridors must be one of the main 
priorities of these agreements.  
5.  CONCLUSIONS 
Three different, though related, gravity models were examined in this paper. The 
first  model  checked  the  relevance  of  the  Andean  Preferential  Trade  Agreement  and  of 
adjacency on the members’ trade flows. The second and third ones also considered the 
evolution  of  the  Trade  Agreement  and  adjacency  factors,  but  included  the  role  of 
infrastructure. One model evaluated the global importance of reducing distance between 
bilateral  partners  and  the  other  separated  the  effects  by  the  importer  and  exporter,  to 
determine  which  infrastructure  endowments  are  more  relevant  in  reducing  physical 
distance.  
All the results confirmed that economic size is crucial when trade is concerned. 
Even  within  regional  agreements,  it  is  important  to  stress  that  size  marks  the  level  of 
bargaining a country faces. When trade is involved, states are interested in their relative 
purchasing capabilities and, therefore, in the economic power of the others. As economic   21
size cannot be easily modified by short-term policies, countries should focus initially on 
other variables, like infrastructure or preferential agreements, to foster not only trade but 
growth as well. Notwithstanding, in any regional negotiation, the role of the size of the 
economies must be considered. 
The  first  gravity  model  confirmed  that  the  Andean  Community  had  a  positive 
impact on trade within the region and with third partners. The positive evolution of the 
coefficients, together with their low values, means that the Pact gained strength slowly, due 
to the complex and full of exceptions integration process. The second model did confirm 
that the Preferential Trade Agreement became relevant only in the ‘90s, when members 
made  the  FTA  operational.  It  also  pointed  out  that  its  impact  becomes  larger  when 
infrastructure endowments are considered. Reducing the cost and improving the quality of 
transport systems through infrastructure development improves international market access 
and prompts an increase in trade. 
As  the  New  Regionalism  takes  place  in  the  world  in  general,  IDB  (2002),  and 
liberalization continues to reduce trade barriers and tariffs, the effective rate of protection 
due to transportation costs derived from poor infrastructure may be considerably higher 
than the one provided by tariffs. Undoubtedly, the Andean Community should restate its 
integration approach and set in motion appropriate mechanisms to improve its geopolitical 
stability,  attract  foreign  direct  investment,  foster  functional  regional  cooperation  - 
especially in infrastructure - and improve its economic and political negotiating position vis 
à vis other groups or countries. But it should also foster a new type of integration oriented 
to  macroeconomic  stability,  cooperation  at  different  fronts  and  global  competitiveness, 
rather than to purely trade measures; otherwise the impact of its preferential agreement will 
progressively dilute as tariffs among Latin American countries come down through new 
regional agreements. In this perspective, bilateral trade will ultimately be defined in terms 
of  costs  and  competitiveness.  But  competitiveness  will  only  be  achieved  by  an 
improvement  in  logistic  and  transportation  services  at  all  points  in  the  production-
distribution  chain,  and  the  respective  reduction  in  costs  brought  out  by  a  more 
encompassing kind of Regional Integration. 
The second model also showed that the influence of sharing a common frontier, 
enabling  border  trade,  is  losing  importance.  As  transportation  costs  decreased,  and  the 
Preferential Trade Agreement shaped up, promoting also infrastructure development, the   22
importance of borders lessened. However, as land transport is the favored mode of a large 
percentage  of  the  growing  flows of  goods,  and  border  trade  is  an important  source  of 
economic activities between neighbors, intra-Andean borders should be properly equipped 
to efficiently interlink national economies. It is crucial to open trade corridors and centers 
of development that connect, through their border territories, interior regions of the Andean 
countries with Pacific and Atlantic ports. These corridors will enable the existence of true 
crossroad spaces with their privileged geographic position as a main asset.   
The evolution, sign, significance and values of the Geographical Distance variable 
stressed again the positive influence of infrastructure on trade, and strongly suggest that, as 
the  Andean  Agreement  evolves  into  a  more  sophisticated  and  complex  process  of 
integration, infrastructure is the most manageable variable in the hands of governments for 
decreasing transport costs.    
The results of the final gravity model, separately considering the infrastructure of 
the Andean countries and their partners, illustrate that nowadays the infrastructure of a 
country is decisive not only to import the locally required goods but also to qualify as a 
trade  partner.  Improving  infrastructure  in  poor  and  middle  income  countries,  like  the 
Andean ones, brings high global returns in terms of trade (Brun, Carrere, Guillaumont, and 
De Melo, 2002) 
Finally, the development of infrastructure should not only be regarded as a tool to 
increase trade. Infrastructure development within the framework of functional cooperation 
among South American economies should be regarded as a major development factor.  
 
 
Annex: THE INFRASTRUCTURE INDEX 
 
Several approaches to construct an infrastructure index have been used by different 
authors.  Owen (1987) graded countries in terms of infrastructure by using a linear average 
of  several  infrastructure  measures  and  establishing  a  value  of  100  to  one  country  and 
relating  the  others  to  it.  Hulten  (1997)  chose  to  normalize  individual  measures  of 
infrastructure in quartiles. He then assigned a value to each of the ordered quartiles and, 
from  these  infrastructure  rankings,  constructed  an  index  by  taking  simple  averages, 
Calderón and Chong  (2004).  Limão  and  Venables  (2001) obtained  an  index  from  four   23
variables:  kilometers  of  road,  of  paved  road,  and  of  railroads  per  square  kilometer  of 
country area, and telephone main lines per person. Factor components to normalize the 
variables  and  also  a  Cobb  Douglas  production  function  were  used.    Nevertheless,  the 
authors - as others of similar methods - stated that the normalizations did not affect the 
results in general terms. Martinez-Zarzoso and Nowak-Lehmann (2002) used the same four 
infrastructure variables but only normalized the telephone lines variable for 1000 people.  
The authors obtained a simple average infrastructure index per country. 
The index we used is calculated on the base of five infrastructure variables: the four 
used  by  Limão  and  Venables  (2001)  plus  kilowatts  of  electricity  generating  capacity. 
Usually, quantity variables are normalized to make them independent of the size of the 
country;  therefore  telephone  main  lines  and  kilowatts  of  electricity  were  divided  by 
population (roads, paved roads and railroads were already normalized by square kilometers 
of  country  area).    This  procedure  was  inspired  by  Canning,  who  considered  that 
normalization of rival goods by population seems appropriate since the quantity of the good 
divided by population indicates average consumption
14. Nevertheless, for non-rival goods, 
normalizing by population does not give average per capita consumption, as an increase in 
population  with  a  fixed  stock  of  non-rival  infrastructure  does  not  reduce  average 
consumption. Hence, to normalize transportation infrastructure data by area, as done by 
Ingram and Liu (1997), Limão and Venables (2001) and in our case, makes sense.  
The  reason  to  include  kilowatts  of  electricity  is  due  to  the  fact  that  electricity 
contributes  to  the  general  economic  activities,  being  crucial  to  telecommunication, 
computer  and  machinery  operations.  Also,  most  activities,  at  least  at  one  point  in  the 
transportation  and  trade  processes,  like  port  operation  and  data  processing,  rely  on 
electricity. Moreover, proper electrification along roads allows safe and efficient movement 
of cargo, especially at night, when most of the road transportation is carried out in the 
Andean countries.    
  For lack of comparable data across countries and along a sufficient period of time, 
we excluded ports and airport data, which represent a small share of overall infrastructure 
endowments. For similar reasons, power only included electricity. Moreover, the analysis 
                                                 
14 A good is rival in nature when the use of that good by one agent precludes the simultaneous use of the same 
goods by other agents. (See “Non-rival productivity inputs”, available at: 
 www.hassler-j.iies.su.se/Courses/macro/2000/growth3.pdf).   24
only incorporates quantitative stocks rather than qualitative measures, as data evidencing 
efficiency of operation is hardly available. 
The final index is a linear average of the five (normalized) infrastructure variables, 
calculated for each country in the sample, for the period 1985-1995. The value of the index 
for the countries in the regressions can be obtained from the authors. We mention that 
normalizing the infrastructure variables eliminated the effects of size; small countries like 
Belgium, the Netherlands or Japan rank high,  as their infrastructure is well developed, 
despite the fact that in terms of absolute kilometers or number of telephones they may seem 
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Table 1: Andean Community: Trade Patterns,  1992-2001  
(Millions of US  dollars)  
 
 
  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001 
Exports 
(FOB) 
                   
TOTAL  28378  29740  34252  37903  45500  47677  38896  43208  57423  50173 
ANDEAN 
COMMUNITY  
2225  2868  3428  4801  4693  5628  5411  3939  5167  5631 
Bolivia  91  120  196  218  260  251  320  293  311  367 
Colombia  1014  1139  1110  1937  1839  2115  2130  1634  2161  2741 
Ecuador  178  295  386  359  428  636  540  445  662  760 
Perú  276  269  310  405  418  515  468  347  446  523 
Venezuela  666  1045  1426  1882  1748  2111  1953  1220  1586  1240 
MERCOSUR  861  921  1216  1479  1642  1979  1516  1685  2299  1807 
EUROPEAN 
UNION-15 
5093  4834  6403  7183  7211  6981  6238  5589  5605  5949 
NAFTA  13446  14410  15379  16205  22433  22800  17567  21337  29149  23200 
ASEAN  136  117  180  195  230  254  125  172  306  274 
MCCA  536  565  623  631  774  911  750  942  1262  1109 
CARICOM  664  679  1217  609  579  392  374  512  1098  1016 
Imports (CIF)                     
TOTAL  27162  29401  30731  38324  37026  43982  45709  35423  39754  44778 
ANDEAN 
COMMUNITY 
2108  2646  3279  4880  4907  5907  5209  4098  5477  5872 
Bolivia  40  77  103  116  141  166  175  157  168  179 
Colombia  694  1292  1542  1845  1848  2232  1900  1438  1612  1400 
Ecuador  160  181  494  706  653  918  965  578  859  1170 
Perú  596  522  646  1190  1433  1564  1175  980  1399  1147 
Venezuela  618  573  494  1023  832  1027  994  945  1439  1977 
MERCOSUR  2233  2337  2408  2961  2676  3258  3461  2626  3344  3947 
EUROPEAN 
UNION-15 
5607  5721  5855  6892  6946  7562  8380  6421  6508  6971 
NAFTA  11988  12616  12246  15671  15620  18546  18552  14796  15404  16893 
ASEAN  149  152  221  277  313  327  358  292  429  509 
MCCA  66  72  93  153  118  121  198  102  92  117 
Source: www.comunidadandina.com 
 
Table 2: Gravity Model Estimates 
(standardized coefficients) 
 
  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999 
YiYj  0.897 *  0.862 *  0.896 *  0.882 *  0.901 *  0.867 *  0.865 * 
Dij  -0.435 *  -0.403 *  -0.443 *  -0.413 *  -0.377 *  -0.347 *  -0.345 * 
D ACP  0.102 *  0.101 *  0.128 *  0.155 *  0.159 *  0.143 *  0.160 * 
D Border  0.200 *  0.161 *  0.129 *  0.124 *  0.127 *  0.116 *  0.139 * 
No 
Observations   
141   243  240  255  247  261  235 
R
2  0.82  0.722  0.755  0.752  0.780  0.714  0.769 
* Significant at 5%   27
Table 3: Intra-Community Exports by mode of Transport 
1997-1999 






1997  1998  1999 
Road  49.5  51.0  45.7 
Sea  38.5  36.5  39.9 
Rail  0.5  0.3  0.7 
Air  5.7  8.7  9.2 
Multimodal  0.1  0.0  0.0 
Waterway  5.6  2.9  4.4 






Table 4: Intra-Community Border Trade by Road 
1997-1999 




1997  1998  1999  1997-1999  % 
Bolivia to Peru  143  120  68  331  4.50 
Colombia to Ecuador  353  360  198  911  12.38 
Colombia to Peru  7  2  0  9  0.12 
Colombia to Venezuela  802  847  688  2337  31.77 
Ecuador to Colombia  336  269  207  812  11.04 
Ecuador to Peru  23  11  13  47  0.64 
Peru to Bolivia  92  91  84  267  3.63 
Peru to Colombia  3  1  2  6  0.08 
Peru to Ecuador  64  34  14  112  1.52 
Venezuela to Colombia  982  1073  470  2525  34.32 
TOTAL  2805  2807  1744  7357  100.00 
Source: www.comunidadandina.org   28
 
Table 5: Andean Community, 1985-1995: 
First Gravity Model Including Infrastructure 
Empirical Results (standardized coefficients) 
 
Year  ln YiYj  ln GeoDistance  Dummy 
ACP 
Dummy Border  R
2
  n 
1985  0.744 *  -0.252 *  0.007  0.410 *  0.677  125 
1986  0.729 *  -0.250 *  0.021  0.384 *  0.664  129 
1987  0.743 *  -0.243 *  0.032  0.374 *  0.666  131 
1988  0.780 *  -0.211 *  0.041  0.390 *  0.717  134 
1989  0.727 *  -0.244 *  0.080  0.371 *  0.653  133 
1990  0.773 *  -0.206 *  0.170 *  0.386 *  0.692  140 
1991  0.798 *  -0.228 *  0.243 *  0.349 *  0.735  132 
1992  0.791 *  -0.256 *  0.159 *  0.371 *  0.757  135 
1993  0.786 *  -0.245 *  0.197 *  0.339 *  0.777  143 
1994  0.750 *  -0.256 *  0.227 *  0.307 *  0.728  146 
1995  0.718 *  -0.293 *  0.237 *  0.264 *  0.712  151 







Table 6: Andean Community, 1985-1995: 
Second Gravity Model Including Infrastructure (of reporter and partner) 
Empirical Results (standardized coefficients) 
 










  n 
1985  0.782 *  -0.207 *  -0.179 *  -0.034  0.374 *  0.687  125 
1986  0.775 *  -0.278 *  -0.161 *  -0.087  0.337 *  0.695  129 
1987  0.798 *  -0.243 *  -0.182 *  -0.017  0.327 *  0.688  131 
1988  0.843 *  -0.302 *  -0.127 *  -0.031  0.328 *  0.764  134 
1989  0.802 *  -0.338 *  -0.135 *  -0.010  0.302 *  0.704  133 
1990  0.840 *  -0.267 *  -0.107 *  0.119 *  0.330 *  0.722  140 
1991  0.841 *  -0.262 *  -0.142 *  0.175 *  0.295 *  0.765  132 
1992  0.825 *  -0.215 *  -0.196 *  0.118 *  0.330 *  0.777  135 
1993  0.806 *  -0.199 *  -0.187 *  0.154 *  0.301 *  0.795  143 
1994  0.770 *  -0.191 *  -0.203 *  0.190 *  0.271 *  0.747  146 
1995  0.750 *  -0.227 *  -0.211 *  0.190 *  0.220 *  0.729  151 
(*) Significant at 5%.   29
Table 7: Ten Main Bilateral Trade Relationships 
in South America (1998) 
(Millions of US dollars) 
 
Bilateral Trade Partners  Flows  % 
Argentina-Brazil  14411.3  38.64 
Colombia-Venezuela  2577.8  6.91 
Argentina-Chile  2413.5  6.47 
Brazil-Chile  1851  4.96 
Brazil-Uruguay  1815.6  4.87 
Brazil-Paraguay  1598.7  4.29 
Brazil-Venezuela  1367.3  3.67 
Argentina-Uruguay  1338.1  3.59 
Colombia-Ecuador  856.5  2.30 
Argentina-Paraguay  751.7  2.02 
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